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Abstract
The national treatment obligation, along with the most favored nation obligation, is
an important principle of non-discrimination adopted by the World Trade Organization.
It requires that foreign products be treated no less favorably than national products.
This paper empirically examines the 1996 WTO recommendation that a Japanese dis-
tilled alcoholic beverage, shochu, be classed as a “directly competitive or substitutable
product” with regard to other distilled drinks, and thus that not taxing similarly be
in violation of its national treatment obligation. Demand estimates obtained from a
random-coeﬃcient discrete-choice model reveal that a substitution pattern of shochu is
far more complicated than that presumed by the WTO. Upon the WTO recommen-
dation, Japan made all distilled alcoholic beverages be taxable at the same level in
2000. Our simulation analysis indicates that the revised tax rates improved but did not
maximize Japanese national welfare.
Keywords: National treatment obligation; WTO; Random coeﬃcient discrete choice model;
tax.
JEL classiﬁcation: F13; L66; H21
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The national treatment (NT) obligation, along witht h em o s tf a v o r e dn a t i o n( M F N )o b l i g a t i o n ,i s
an important pillar supporting the principle of non-discrimination at the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Whereas the MFN obligation requires equal treatment for goods from diﬀerent nations,
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1the NT obligation requires the treatment of imported goods, once they have cleared customs, to
be no worse than that of domestically produced goods (See for example Jackson, 1997). The
NT obligation was adopted as part of the undertaking by the WTO to prevent domestic tax and
regulatory policies from being used as protectionist tools that would oﬀset its eﬀorts to reduce
border restrictions to the ﬂow of goods. The interpretation of the NT obligation is of critical
importance to WTO members, because it has a profound impact on these countries’ freedom to
formulate domestic policy.
A major interpretative issue with regard to the NT obligation is to determine whether imported
and domestic products are “directly competitive or substitutable,” under the stipulation of Article
III.2 of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) of 1994. While the absence of a
“directly competitive and substitutable” relationship between imported and domestically produced
products precludes any possibility of protectionist measures contrary to the NT provision, it is
interesting to note that case law has not clariﬁed the interpretation of the terms. As Horn and
Mavroidis (2004: 43) state, the WTO has no clear methodology to oﬀer for the interpretation of
the NT obligation, let alone for determining which products might be “directly competitive and
substitutable”. To our knowledge, the present paper is the ﬁrst to oﬀer empirical evidence on the
role of the NT obligation in regulation and taxation of Japanese alcoholic beverages.
In 1995, the EU, the US, and Canada requested consultations with Japan at the WTO, under the
claim that a Japanese law taxed the locally produced alcoholic beverage shochu more favorably than
several other import-dominated distilled alcoholic beverages (Japan—Tax on Alcoholic Beverages
(WTO, 1996b), hereafter Japan—Tax). In November 1996, Japan accepted the WTO Appellate
Body’s recommendation that the complainants’ claim be considered legitimate. To comply with
the recommendation, Japan revised its Liquor Tax Law in 2000. An integral issue in this dispute
was whether shochu and other distilled beverages were “directly competitive and substitutable”
(DCS). 1 In the dispute settlement process, the Appellate Body found that the decisive criterion
in the determination of DCS is whether two products have common end-uses (inter alia)a ss h o w n
by the elasticity of substitution (WTO, 1996b: 25). This empirical issue addressed by the WTO
is highly relevant for the concept of market deﬁn i t i o no f t e ne m p l o y e di nt h eﬁelds of industrial
organization and antitrust economics. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the economics literature has
devoted hardly any attention to this issue. Using the existing methods available in these ﬁelds, this
paper revisits the Japan—Tax dispute, and evaluates ex-post whether the conclusion reached by the
Panel makes sense – in other words, whether shochu and the other distilled beverages were in a
DCS relationship with one another.
1The other issue in Japan-Tax was whether shochu and vodka are ‘like’ product. While the issue of likeness
c o u l db ed i s c u s s e di nt h er e a l mo fe c o n o m i c s ,t h eA p p e l l ate Body decided to rely not on economics but on customs
classiﬁcation (WTO, 1996b). We therefore take no further look into the issue on likeness in this paper.
2First, we perform the test of small but signiﬁcant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP)
to determine whether shochu and other distilled beverages constitute a relevant market. The SSNIP
test is a convenient method used by antitrust practitioners to identify the smallest market relevant
to product competition. Our test reveals that, contrary to the WTO recommendation, shochu by
itself forms a relevant market, independent of other beverages. Since the SSNIP test is known to be
vulnerable to possible statistical biases arising from endogeneity and omitted variables, we proceed
to estimate Japanese consumer demand for alcoholic beverages to examine the robustness of the
result obtained in the SSNIP test. We estimate a random-coeﬃcient discrete-choice model by using
the method recently proposed by Dubé, Fox, and Su (2011). Controlling for possible endogeneity
in price, a substitution pattern is found to be far more complicated than that inferred from the
SSNIP test: the cross-price elasticities are asymmetric and statistically diﬀerent from zero.
The NT obligation is often deemed to be in conﬂict with national sovereignty. In Japan—Tax,t h e
NT obligation placed severe constraints on the Japanese government’s ability to freely determine
domestic alcohol tax rates. In response to the WTO recommendation, the government increased
tax rates on both shochu and liqueurs and decreased them on whisky and other spirits. Nearly
four years after compliance with the recommendation, the Japanese government imposed the same
tax rates on all distilled alcoholic beverages sold domestically. In this paper we perform simulation
exercises based on the obtained demand estimates to assess this revision to Japanese liquor taxes
from a welfare viewpoint, and ﬁnd that, while the tax revision didi m p r o v ed o m e s t i cw e l f a r e ,t h e
ideal tax structure derived from our analysis implies that taxes on shochu should not have been
raised, where in fact they nearly doubled.
The NT obligation has received notable academic attention recently. Horn (2006) oﬀers the
ﬁrst formal analysis of the role of NT in bilateral trade agreements. He investigates the contrac-
tual incompleteness inherent in trade agreements over internal measures and shows that if tariﬀ
agreements account for subsequent tax setting, the NT obligation can improve government welfare
even when a ﬁrst-best contract would call for discrimination against imported products. Though
the present paper does not share the analytical framework proposed by Horn (2006) and later ex-
tended by Saggi and Sara (2008), it ﬁnds empirical evidence consistent with their claim that the
NT obligation enhanced but did not maximize Japanese national welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section (Section 2) provides an overview
of Japan—Tax. A major issue in the dispute was whether shochu was DCS to other distilled alcoholic
beverages; to determine this, in this section, we deﬁne the Japanese distilled-beverage market using
the SSNIP test often used in antitrust economics. To check the robustness of the ﬁndings of the
test, in Section 3 we estimate a random-coeﬃcient discrete-choice model of Japanese demand for
alcoholic beverages in general. Using the estimation results, Section 4 assesses the extent to which
3the revised tax rates after the WTO recommendation had an impact on Japanese economic welfare.
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Historical Background and Preliminary Analysis
This section provides an overview of Japan—Tax, beginning with Subsection 2.1, which describes
an overview of the WTO shochu dispute. A major issue in this dispute was whether shochu and
other distilled beverages were “directly competitive and substitutable” (DCS) with each other. If
they were, the complainant parties claimed, the wide gap between shochu taxes and other Japanese
liquor taxes should have been unacceptable. While the WTO Appellate Body concluded that
shochu and the other distilled alcoholic beverages were DCS, and that the variable taxes violated
the WTO rule. However, the Body did not employ any precise criteria for the determination of
DCS. In Subsection 2.2, we suggest a simple approach corresponding closely to the procedure taken
by an antitrust authority, assessing the impact of, say, a proposed merger between companies.
Our analysis concludes that shochu constituted a relevant market on its own, implying that it and
other beverages were not in a DCS relationship. To check the robustness of the result obtained in
Subsection 2.2, we perform a full-ﬂedged demand analysis in the subsequent section, 2.3.
2.1 Overview of the WTO Dispute
On June 21, 1995, the EU requested consultations with Japan concerning the internal taxes levied
by the Japanese government on certain alcoholic beverages pursuant to Japan’s Liquor Tax Law
(WTO, 1995a). In the following month, the US (WTO, 1995b) and Canada (WTO, 1995c) joined
the consultations. These three parties made essentially the same complaint: that Japan had acted
inconsistently with Article III of GATT by applying higher tax rates to distilled alcoholic beverages,
with the exception of Japanese shochu.
At the time of the consultations, Japan’s Liquor Tax Law classiﬁed alcoholic beverages into
seven categories, four of which were classed as distilled alcohol and as a result come under the
direct focus of this study; these are shochu, liqueur, spirits, and whisky (considered as a category
of its own). The other three were brewed alcohol, including beer and cider; wine; and sake. 2 The
liquor tax on distilled beverage was imposed according to quantity: in 1995, the tax rates, adjusted
by alcohol content, ranged from JPY 5,280/10 L on shochu to JPY 24,558 on whisky, as shown in
Figure 1. 3 While the law made no explicit distinction between domestic and imported alcoholic
2The category of sake includes sake compounds and mirin vinegar.
3To be precise, two kinds of shochu are sold in Japan, depending on the degree of alcohol content. Shochu group
Ac o n t a i n s3 6p e r c e n ta l c o h o lo rl o w e r ,a n dshochu group B has a higher alcohol content. Because of the limited
availability of price data, we use the sales-weighted average of the two groups in this study.
4beverages, the complainant parties said that Japan unduly favored (domestic) shochu over other
distilled beverages, the latter of which were disproportionately imported. Indeed import share of
shochu accounted for a mere 3.4 percent of domestic consumption in 1994, whereas whisky and
other spirits accounted for 22.5 and 27.5 percents respectively.
The complainants and Japan submitted quantitative evidence to a WTO Dispute Panel. The
Japanese government cited statistics on the correlation between price and consumption trends for
the previous twenty years. In contrast, the complainants based their argument on the reactions of
a sample of 400 shochu drinkers to a series of diﬀerent combinations of price levels for shochu and
spirits. While this evidence appears to be subject to either endogeneity in price or bias in sampling
procedure, the Panel nevertheless ruled in favor of the complainants. The WTO Appellate Body
subsequently concluded, in the ﬁnal report on the matter in 1996, that shochu and the other
distilled beverages were in a DCS relationship, and that Japan, by not taxing them at similar
levels, was in violation of its obligation under Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT (WTO,
1996b: 32). In response to the judgment of the Appellate Body, the Japanese government passed a
new amendment to the Liquor Tax Law in October 2000, taxing shochu at the same rate as other
distilled beverages, as shown in Figure 1.
During the settlement process, neither the WTO Panel nor the Appellate Body oﬀered precise
criteria as to how DCS should be determined. While the Appellate Body listed in its report factors
relevant to the criteria, such as cross-price elasticity, product characteristics, and consumer tastes
and habits, it also noted that its list was not exhaustive, and thus did not clarify what weight was
to be given to each of the factors mentioned.
If we understand that the concept of DCS is intended to capture the degree to which an increase
in the tax on a set of products beneﬁts another set of products in terms of increased sales volume,
the appropriate indicator for DCS must then be cross-price elasticity. In the subsequent sections of
this paper, we present formal statistical methods to measure the degree of DCS between shochu and
other distilled beverages in Japan—Tax. We utilize publicly available data and attempt to address
the econometric issues that emerge from this empirical application, which were not adequately
handled in Japan—Tax. We believe that the statistical method proposed in the following sections
will help us understand how to determine DCS, as stipulated in the NT obligation.
In section 3, we apply a discrete choice model to directly estimate cross-price elasticity and
assess the validity of the claim in that shochu and other distilled beverages are DCS toward each
other. First, however, Subsection 2.2 presents a much simpler technique to assess DCS between
shochu and other alcoholic beverages.
52.2 Preliminary Analysis of Market Deﬁnition
In evaluating the DCS relationship between multiple products, an adjudicating body essentially asks
whether the products are in the same relevant market (i.e., whether the level at which the products
are in the same market is the relevant level). If the products are determined to be in the same
market, they must be highly substitutable for each other in the eyes of consumers. Otherwise, they
are not deemed to be in direct competition. While the WTO has no clear approaches to deﬁning
the relevant market, it is noted in the report that “Under national antitrust [...] regimes, the extent
to which products directly compete is measured by the elasticity of substitution” (Paragraph 6.31
of WTO, 1996a).
Before we estimate cross-price elasticity (in Section 3), this subsection proposes the SSNIP
test to identify the smallest market relevant to the product competition of the products under
consideration. The method ﬁnds (to anticipate the result) that shochu constitutes an independent
market of its own, and thus is not DCS to spirits. After presenting the results, we point out the
weaknesses of the test, which lead us to use another method to assess Japanese demand for alcoholic
beverages, as will be seen in the next section.
The SSNIP test was introduced with the US Merger Guidelines of 1982 and has been widely
used by competition authorities to deﬁne relevant markets, in a variety of contexts. Starting with
the narrowest possible market deﬁnition, if it is proﬁtable for a hypothetical monopolist to increase
the price(s) of product(s) in this candidate market by 5 percent, the candidate market is determined
to be the relevant market. This is because the presence of a hypothetical proﬁtable monopolist
implies that the elasticity of substitution of products outside the candidate market is small. If, on
the other hand, the increase in price is not proﬁtable because consumers would substitute products
outside the candidate market, the market deﬁnition must be extended to include the closest of these
substitutes in order to ensure that any product exercising a competitive pressure on the product(s)
in question is included in the market deﬁnition. Products are added to the candidate market until
a 5 percent price increase is proﬁtable for a hypothetical monopolist owning all the products in the
candidate market. The relevant market has then been found.
As Katz and Shapiro (2003) concisely explain, the eﬀect of an SSNIP on a hypothetical monop-
olist’s proﬁt depends on the percentage of unit sales that would be lost as a result of a 5 percent
price increase as well as on the prevailing proﬁt margin earned on each unit sold. The price increase







where qj,t, pj,t and MUj,t are respectively quantity demanded, price and markup for product j in
6year t;a n d∆hj,t is deﬁned as hj,t−hj,t−1,w h e r eh is either p or q. We are interested in investigating
whether or not shochu is DCS to other alcoholic beverages – in other words, whether Japanese
shochu data satisfy equation (1).
Figure 2 shows quantity and price data for the distilled alcoholic beverages examined in this
study. The data, which are publicly available, are traced back to the year of 1994 and forward to
2001, when the revision of the Liquor Tax Law had been completed. The aggregated national-level
data indicate that equation (1) always holds for any values of MUj,t: the left-hand side of (1) takes
the value of 11.24, whereas the right-hand side always takes a negative value. This observation
would suggest that shochu constitutes a relevant market on its own, independent of other distilled
beverages. This inference depends crucially on the observation made in Figure 2, in that price and
quantity of shochu appear to move in the same direction: indeed, the unconditional correlation
coeﬃcient is 0.26. As noted by Trajtenberg (1990), this positive correlation may be due to the lack
of control for endogeneity in the price variable. In the next section, we address these econometric
issues in the demand estimation.
3 Demand Model of Alcoholic Beverages
This section describes the estimation model we use to explain the Japanese alcoholic beverage
market. In Subsection 3.1, we introduce a demand system derived from a random-utility discrete-
choice model of consumer behavior. We do not observe individual purchasing behavior, but instead,
aggregate across individual buyers to obtain the demand for an alcoholic product while still allowing
for heterogeneity across consumers. Subsection 3.2 addresses identiﬁcation issues of this model, and
Subsection 3.3 discusses the estimation results. The demand model and its estimates provide a basis
for the analyses in Section 4, in which we assess the extent to which the revised tax rates following
the WTO recommendation have aﬀected economic welfare in Japan.
3.1 Discrete-Choice Model
This subsection describes a random-coeﬃcient discrete choice model of alcoholic beverages in Japan.
In any particular year, we take an individual of legal drinking age as the purchasing entity, where
each individual has a unit demand for a bottle of alcoholic beverage on a daily basis. We denote
t h em a r k e ts i z eb yMS.4 Our lack of data on individual purchases does not allow us to distinguish
between the decision to visit a store and the decision of how many of bottles to purchase. Since
a bottle size varies, we standardize it at 750 mL.5 Each individual i who is part of market m
4The legal drinking age in Japan is twenty years old. We tested an alternative measure of market size to assess the
population above 15 years old. The demand estimates reported in Section 3.3 are robust to the alternative deﬁnition.
5The alternative assumptions of either 500mL or 1 L for the bottle size make no qualitative diﬀerence to the
results.
7(=1 ,...,M) is assumed to maximize the following indirect utility function at time t (=1 ,...,T)b y
choosing alcoholic beverage j among Jt+1alternatives, one of which is the option of not purchasing
alcoholic beverages:6




j,m,tβi,m,t + ξj,m,t + ²i,j,m,t, (2)
where ui,j,m,t is consumer i’s utility from consuming the alcoholic beverage j in market m at time
t. The income for consumer i who purchases in market m at time t is denoted by yi,m,t,a n dt h e
price of a bottle of alcoholic beverage j is denoted by pj,m,t. Both variables are deﬂated by the
overall CPI index to constant 2005 yen. Note that pj,m,t is after tax; we will discuss in Section
4 how liquor taxes eﬀect the price. The annual data have a regional dimension – we view each
of Japan’s 47 prefectures to be an independent market in this paper. The vector xj,m,t denotes
alcoholic beverage j’s observed attributes, whose k-th component is denoted by xj,k,m,t.W e u s e
in this vector the variables of normalized alcoholic content and a dummy variable that takes one
if beverage j is distilled and zero otherwise. Our data set contains both brewed and distilled
alcoholic beverages, the former including beer (5), sake (15) and wine (13), and the latter liqueurs
(12), shochu (25), spirits other than whisky (37) and whisky (40). Inside the parenthesis is the
drink’s alcohol content (as percentage). The term α denotes consumer’s sensitivity to changes
in real price and income, the parameter to be estimated. The utility function contains ξj,m,t,a n





=0 . In Subsection 3.2, we discuss an econometric endogeneity problem generated by
ξj,m,t.
To enable richer substitution patterns, we follow the model of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1999), allowing diﬀerent consumers to have diﬀerent intensities of preferences for diﬀerent bever-
age characteristics, xj,m,t. W er e l yo nar a n d o m - c o e ﬃcient utility speciﬁcation and assume that
individual preference intensity is represented by βi,m,t,w h o s ek-th component is denoted by βi,k,m,t:
βi,k,m,t = βk + πkyi,m,t + νi,k,
where νi,k follows the normal distribution with mean zero and variance σk. Note that for each
characteristic of xj,k,m,t,c o n s u m e ri’s taste varies with her income yi,m,t and a taste shock νi,k.
While we lack data on individual consumer income, the income distribution at the market level
is well approximated by the log-normal distribution, dGm,t (y), with the mean and variance of
the distribution being obtained annually from Shinozaki (2007). Note that yi,m,t is the (i,m,t)-
th component of y, and that the density dGm,t (·) is allowed to diﬀer by year and market. We
6The market share for the outside option is on average 65 percent. In the study period, no entry nor exit of
products is observed; thus Jt does not depend on t.
8assume that the taste variable, νi,k, is drawn from an i.i.d. standard normal distribution, and the
parameters to be estimated, πk and σk, capture the variances in consumer tastes for characteristic
xj,k,m,t. Consumers with similar demographic attributes tend to have similar product rankings,
and thus similar substitution patterns. The inclusion of the random coeﬃcients, βi,m,t in (2) allows
for correlation between alcoholic beverage types with similar characteristics, and thus presumably
for more realistic substitution patterns relative to the traditional logit model.
Let ²i,j,m,t represent the idiosyncratic taste of consumer i for product j in market m at time
t, and follows the type-I extreme value. We assume that the mean utility from the outside option
is normalized to zero. The distribution assumption yields the following closed-form probability of























where dF(ν) represents the joint standard normal density of taste shocks, ν,t h e(i,k)-th element
of which is νi,k, as introduced in (2). Note that the market share of the outside option, s0,m,t,
is obtained by 1 −
P
j sj,m,t. We make the independence assumption in dF(ν) and dGm,t(y),
and follow the estimation method detailed in Dubé, Fox and Su (2011) to form a generalized
method of moment (GMM) estimator. The population moment condition is a product of ξj,m,t
and instrumental variables introduced in the next subsection. While Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1995; BLP) proposes to numerically compute the market shares by means of inversion, Dubé et al
(2011) points out that the BLP method would generate numerical errors in calculating the nested
ﬁxed point. They instead propose to solve a mathematical program under the constraint that
sj,m,t as obtained in (3) equals the observed market shares.7 In the next subsection, we discuss the
instrumental variables used for the GMM objective function.
3.2 Instruments
We are concerned that the variable of price may be correlated with the error, ξj,m,t.I ti sl i k e l yt h a t
the observed characteristics do not capture all the important dimensions of the alcoholic beverages
under study; indeed, ξj,m,t is often interpreted as the unobserved quality error. If ξj,m,t is correctly
7For each combination of m and t, we draw 20 individuals for yi,m,t from the distribution dGm,t(y), and another
1,000 draws of νi,k,m,t from dF(ν) for those consumers who have income of yi,m,t. Doubling the number of draws
make little changes to the estimation results discussed in the next section.
9perceived by consumers and sellers in the market, this unobserved quality error is likely to be
correlated with price: Better-quality products may induce higher willingness to pay, and sellers
may be able to charge higher prices, perhaps due to higher marginal costs.
Traditionally, the cost variables excluded from xj,m,t are used as instruments in homogeneous-
goods models, and this practice is still appropriate here. As an instrument of this sort, we employ
liquor tax per bottle, standardized by alcohol content. The liquor tax is levied on producers before
the product is shipped; thus, the tax is included in the price measure, and it is unlikely to be
inﬂuenced by unobserved demand shocks.
In a product diﬀerentiation model, the costs of rival products are appropriate instruments. With
market power in supply, the markup of each product depends on the costs of the other products.
The liquor taxes on the other products are thus related to pj,m,t, but since the liquor tax is assumed
to be exogenous, they are still valid instruments. We include in the set of instruments the sum of
liquor taxes of other products in the distilled and brewed alcoholic beverages.
Information from the income distribution may also help identify the parameter, α.W eu s ea s
instruments the means and variances of the distribution by market and by year, from which we draw
the sample of individuals in the estimation of (2).8 We also include in the set of instruments the
interaction terms between the mean income levels and three exogenous variables, namely, alcohol
content and liquor tax rate for each beverage and a dummy variable for distilled drinks.
3.3 Demand Estimates
This subsection presents estimation results for the demand model discussed in the previous sub-
section. The dataset of annual frequency used covers the 1994—1995 period, during which the
WTO conducted their investigation for Japan—Tax.W e d e ﬁne the geographic market m,a so n e
prefecture. In the demand estimation, we include data on brewed as well as distilled beverages,
so that a consumer in the model has eight choices, including the outside option. By incorporat-
ing brewed beverages in our analysis, we hope that our estimates of cross-price elasticities below
will be insusceptible to the assumption of an outside option. We describe the data sources in the
Appendix.
Table 1 presents three estimation results. Models (1-A) and (1-B) are based on a standard
logit model, in which we allow for no heterogeneity in individual preferences. In these models,
we replace the second term in the right-hand side of (2) with αpj,m,t, and impose on the indirect
utility (2) a restriction on the same coeﬃcients across individuals (in other words, πk and σk are
zero). While (1-A) is estimated by the ordinary-least squares (OLS) method, (1-B) is not, and
8To check the robustness of the sampling procedure regarding income distribution, we further disaggregate Gm,t (y)
by gender and use the data on the ratio of male and female workers by market and by year to estimate the model.
The qualitative results discussed in the rest of the paper do not change under this alternative speciﬁcation.
10allows for endogeneity in the price coeﬃcient. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic for the explanatory power
of the instruments conditional upon the included exogenous variables is 124.6, indicating that the
instruments are not weak. The estimated price coeﬃcients are found positive.
Estimates obtained from the random-coeﬃcient model discussed in Subsection 3.1 are shown
under (1-C). The chi-squared statistic tests the validity of the instruments conditional on there
being a set of valid instruments that just identify the model. This does not allow us to reject the
orthogonality condition between some of the instruments and the error term.
The random-coeﬃcient model appears to ﬁt the data moderately well. We calculate the goodness
of ﬁt measure, which summarizes the discrepancy between observed market shares and the shares
predicted under the model in question. The goodness of ﬁt is 0.84 for (1-C) and 0.19 for (1-B).
This ﬁnding corroborates with the estimated correlation coeﬃcient between observed and predicted
market shares, which is 0.96 for (1-C) and 0.62 for (1-B).
We also examine out-of-sample predictions for the ﬁve years (1996—2001) after the period of
estimation. Surprisingly, given the substantial changes in liquor tax rates over the period shown in
Figure 1, Model (1-C) explains the data well over this 5-year period, with a goodness of ﬁtm e a s u r e
of 0.54, and does especially well in predicting market shares: the correlation coeﬃcient between
observed and predicted market shares is 0.94. This out-of-sample analysis provides additional
evidence on the importance of incorporating preference heterogeneity when accounting for the data
under study.
The mean of the coeﬃcient in the alcohol content variable is estimated to be negative and
statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated standard deviation of the same coeﬃcient implies that
consumer preference regarding alcohol content is indeed diverse. The estimates also indicate that
consumers with higher income tends to prefer beverages with lower alcohol content. However, none
of the coeﬃcients in the distillation dummy variable are statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding may
indicate that the average consumer is indiﬀerent to whether the alcoholic beverage in question is
distilled or brewed. This observation has a bearing on the substitution pattern discussed below in
this section.
The price coeﬃcient is negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero. Using the obtained price
estimate from Model (1-C), we present in Table 2 estimated own- and cross-price elasticities for
all the seven types of beverage under study. The (m,n) element in the elasticities matrix indicates
the elasticity of n with respect to a change in the price of m. While the logit model restricts
all elasticities in a particular row of the matrix to the same value, a random-coeﬃcient model
allows these elasticities to diﬀer with diﬀerences in the price sensitivity between diﬀerent types of
consumers purchasing various alcoholic beverages. The table indicates that the demand for distilled
beverages is inelastic, lying in the range from —0.50 for whisky to —0.10 for shochu. A closer look at
11the table shows also that demand for beer, the value of which is —0.09, is less elastic than demand
for the distilled beverages. These ﬁndings are similar to those found in previous literature. Fogarty
(2010), for example, reviews actual, reported individual-country own-price elasticity estimates,
concluding that the demand for alcoholic beverages is price-inelastic and ﬁnds little support for the
idea that demand for alcoholic beverages (except wine) varies fundamentally across most countries.
Cook and Moore (1999), and Chaloupka, Grossman, and Saﬀer (2002) also report that the demand
for beer is the least elastic among these alcoholic beverages, which corroborates with our estimates
presented in Table 2.
Cross-price elasticities among distilled beverages are statistically diﬀerent from zero, but appear
to be economically insigniﬁcant. The estimated random coeﬃcient for alcohol content indicate that
individual consumers had diﬀerent tastes regarding the amount of alcohol in their drinks. Indeed,
Table 2 shows that, although the values are small, cross-price demand for beverages with similar
alcohol content is more elastic than for beverages with widely divergent alcohol content. While
market-level aggregated data do not allow us to infer the underlying reasons for these small cross-
price elasticities, they may be due to persistent consumer habits regarding the purchase of alcoholic
beverages. Indeed, Fogarty (2010) reports that consumers respond to price discounting by engaging
in inventory behavior rather than substituting diﬀerent alcoholic beverages.
The estimated substitution pattern, being statistical signiﬁcant but economically insigniﬁcant,
seems to fall between the claims of the complainants in Japan—Tax and those of Japan; the former
argued that all distilled beverages were DCS, while the latter alleged that shochu was not DCS
with the other distilled alcohol beverages. The Panel and the Appellate Body agreed with the
complainants, and as a result, the Japanese government revised its Liquor Tax Law to tax all
distilled beverages at the same rates. We evaluate this revision in the next section.
4 Evaluating Japan’s Liquor Taxes
The NT obligation is often seen as imposing constraints on national sovereignty (Jackson, 1997).
With regard to the Japanese Liquor Tax Law under study, the NT obligation constrained the
Japanese government from freely determining domestic alcoholic taxes; in conformity with the
WTO’s recommendation, the government eventually reformed the Law in 2000 to tax all distilled
alcoholic beverages at the same rate. As shown in Figure 1, the revised tax rates on whisky were
more than 50 percent lower than the previous rates, and those on shochu and liqueurs increased
respectively by 93 and 21 percents.
Did this tax revision contribute to the national welfare? This section provides an answer to
the question. Based on the model and estimates reported in the previous sections, this section
measures the impact of the tax revision on Japanese people’s economic welfare. Below, we begin
12with a deﬁnition of “social surplus” based on the demand model presented in Subsection 3.1 and
then evaluate the Japanese liquor tax revision completed in 2000.
It is reasonable to assume that the social welfare is the sum of three elements: consumer surplus,
CSt; producer surplus, PSt; and tax revenues, TRt. All three of them are a function of rt, a vector
of the liquor tax rates at the end of period t. Note that, as shown in Figure 1, liquor tax rates diﬀer
by beverage type but are uniform across markets. Given the ﬁnding in the previous section that
brewed beverages are not often substituted for distilled ones, we focus solely on distilled beverages


























Remember that MSm,t is the market size at market m in year t. The price of product j is
now a function of rt, while the relationship between pj,m,t and rt depends on the degree of “pass-
through”, which is determined by market competitiveness and elasticity of demand. For example,
if the market is perfectly competitive, the pass-through is complete; whereas if the elasticity of
demand is perfectly elastic, the pass-through is nil.
To obtain a sense of the degree of pass-through in our study, we assessed the supply-side behavior
of the Japanese liquor market. With a lack of data on individual suppliers, we have no knowledge of
either their production costs or their ownership structure. Under the assumption that each supplier



















⎠ − Θ ·
⎛





























p = mc − Θ · B (p) · s,
where p ≡ (p1,...,pJ)
0, s ≡ (s1,...,s J)
0,a n dmc ≡ (mc1,...,mc J)
0.N o t e t h a t Aj is a vector of
(Aj,1,1,...,A j,M,T),w h e r eA is either p, s or mc. Eq. (5) implies that price, p, consists of two
13elements: marginal cost, or mc, and markup, represented by the second term on the right-hand
side of the equation. The latter element depends on the degree of competitiveness in the market of
product j, denoted by a (M · T)×1 vector, θj. The diagonal matrix Θ is deﬁned as diag(θ1,...,θJ).
Note that, conditional on product j, we assume that the value of θj is the same for all m and t.
Conduct parameter θj takes a value from 0 (where the market is perfectly competitive) to 1 (where
the market is monopolistic). We estimate Θ below in this section. Note that sj is presented as a
fraction of the total number of consumers who are of legal drinking age.
Each element of B is calculated from the probability formula deﬁned in (3). Note that the
cross derivatives diﬀer, depending on the consumer attributes ν and y. Each component of B can
be computed by the demand estimates. The marginal cost of producing beverage j for market m
in year t is denoted by mcj,m,t. Since no data are available on product-level marginal cost, we
substitute mc with the matrix of year- and product-dummies, D, with a vector of parameters, γ,
to be estimated. Thus, using the data and obtained demand estimates presented in Table 3, we
estimate the following system of equations in the 1994—1995 data:
p = D0γ − Θ · b B · s + e,
Note that b B is the cross-derivative acquired using the demand estimates under Model (1-C),
and e is a vector of the error term. We apply 2SLS to the above equation by using as instruments
the variables associated with the income distribution introduced in Subsection 3.2. As shown in
Table 3, none of the conduct parameters, Θ, are estimated to be statistically diﬀerent from zero,
implying that the market is reasonably approximated by a model assuming perfect competition.
This result is robust to the inclusion of the market-speciﬁc dummy variable in D (under 3-B), or
to the expansion of the product categories to incorporate brewed alcoholic beverages (under 3-C).
Combining this ﬁnding with the fact that many producers exist in each market, it may be
reasonable to assume that the liquor tax on product j has complete pass-through on pj.T h e
demand estimates obtained in Section 3 enable us to assess the extent to which the quantities
demanded respond to the changes in rt. The tax revenues, TRt, are thus calculated as the product
of rt and
P
m Mm,t · (s1,m,t,...,s J,m,t)
0.
Table 4 shows consumer welfare and tax revenues before and after the tax revision. We employ
the demand estimates under (1-C) in Table 1 to calculate consumer welfare before the revision
using (4). The same procedure is applied to the calculation of the consumer surplus after the
revision, except that we now employ the post-revision tax rates in 2000, r2000, when the tax revision
completed. The eﬀect of the liquor tax revision on consumer surplus is therefore evaluated by the
diﬀerence between surpluses before and after the revision. National welfare is the sum of consumer
welfare and tax revenues under the competitive market inferred from the above exercise.
14Table 4 indicates that the increase in taxes on shochu and liqueurs had more eﬀect on consumer
surplus than the decrease in tax on whisky. This is mainly because, as seen in Table 3 and Figure
1, the demand for shochu is less elastic and the size of the demand four times larger than that for
whisky. As a consequence, the consumer surplus would have declined as a result of the tax revision
to comply with the WTO recommendation. On the other hand, the increase in shochu tax rates
substantially improve Japanese government revenue. All in all, the liquor tax revision improved
the social surplus by the annual amount of JPY 6.87 billion, or the equivalent of USD 62 million.9
In order to assess how close revision moved the liquor tax structure to optimal, we compute
the optimal tax rates (those which maximize the social surplus as deﬁned above in this section).
The optimal tax rates for the year of 1995 are shown in Figure 3. In accordance with the measure
used by the WTO and with the structure of the Liquor Tax Law in Japan, we transform the
tax rate per bottle into the rate per 10 L on the assumption of 100-percent alcohol content. It is
worthwhile to observe that the optimal tax rates diﬀer substantially across beverage types, reﬂecting
mainly diﬀerences in the values of own-price elasticities. In particular, we ﬁnd that optimal tax
rates positively correlate with the alcohol content of the liquor. The optimal tax rates per bottle is
estimated to be respectively JPY 97.4 for shochu (25 percent alcohol), 75.8 for liqueur (12 percent),
102.1 for spirits (37 percent) and 102.5 for whisky (40 percent).
It is also interesting to note that the tax rates on shochu and liqueurs were set close to the
optimal level, whereas the tax on whisky seems to have been excessive. In implementing the
WTO recommendation, the Japanese government thus appears to have partially corrected for prior
distortion in the consumption of whisky but introduced new distortion in the consumption of shochu
and liqueurs. This new distortion came into being primarily because the WTO recommended that
the tax rates on all distilled beverages, including shochu, should be the same. This recommendation
was presumably made on the basis of the Appellate Body’s ﬁnding that shochu was in a DCS
relationship with other distilled alcoholic beverages. The estimated demand elasticities in Table
2 imply that the substitution pattern of distilled beverages is far more complicated than that
suggested by DCS. Our calculation indicate that should the rates be optimally set, the social
surplus would be enhanced by the annual amount of JPY 1.55 billion, or the equivalent of USD
13.99 million USD.
The ﬁndings above is consistent with a theoretical observation ﬁrst made by Horn (2006) and
later extended by Saggi and Sara (2008). Horn (2006) oﬀers the ﬁrst formal theoretical analysis
of the role of the NT obligation. He examines the contractual incompleteness inherent in bilateral
trade agreements over internal (e.g., tax) measures, and shows that if tariﬀ agreements account for
subsequent tax setting incentives, the NT obligation can improve welfare even when it is socially
9We use the averaged 2005 exchange rate of JPY 110.8 to the USD.
15optimal to discriminate against imports. While our current empirical framework do not contain a
feature of contractual incompleteness like the one embedded in Horn (2006), our quantitative ﬁnd-
ings mentioned above corroborate his theoretical implication in that the NT obligation enhanced,
but did not maximize, Japan’s national welfare.
5C o n c l u s i o n
While the NT obligation is a pillar supporting the WTO’s non-discrimination principle, it has been
neglected in the literature relative to the attention given the MFN obligation. This paper has
provided the ﬁrst empirical study on the role of the NT obligation, using the case of Japan—Tax,
in which the Panel and Appellate Body were confronted with a Japanese law taxing the locally
produced alcoholic beverage shochu more lightly than distilled drinks dominated by import brands.
Though Japan argued that shochu was not in a DCS relationship with the distilled beverages, the
Panel and Appellate Body found that all products concerned were DCS with all others.
This paper employed a random-coeﬃcient discrete-choice model to assess purchasing behavior of
alcoholic beverages by Japanese consumers and identiﬁed an asymmetric structure in the estimated
cross-price elasticities. This ﬁnding runs counter to the WTO recommendation that shochu is in
a DCS relationship to other distilled beverages, and thus needs to be taxed similarly to them.
Indeed, contrary to the claim of the complainants in Japan—Tax that shochu was treated excessively
favorably in the Japanese liquor tax regime, this paper has discovered that the tax rate on shochu
was close to the level which would have maximized the domestic social surplus, whereas the tax on
whisky was excessively high. The paper ﬁnds that, while the policy adopted as a result of the WTO
recommendation was not the best one from the national-welfare point of view, it did eventually
improve Japan’s social surplus by substantially reducing the tax on whisky.
Appendix: Data Sources
Estimating this model requires data on quantity, price, and alcohol content by beverage type, which
were obtained from the Japanese Annual Statistical Data on Liquor & Food Industries in the period
from 1994 to 2001. The data are disaggregated by prefecture, and we consider each prefecture to
be an independent market. Data on alcohol content of distilled and brewed beverages is available
from the National Tax Agency’s Annual Statistics Report. The estimation also uses data on income
distribution obtained from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure. Information on distribution means
is annually available for each market, broken down by gender, from the Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare, and information on the variance of the distribution is reported in Shinozaki (2007).
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